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FEATURE ARTICLES
Consumer Choice:
The Practical Reason for Both Antitrust
and Consumer Protection Law
By Neil W. Averitt and Robert H. Lande

This article is about the relationship between
antitrust and consumer protection law. Its
purpose is to define each area of law, to delineate the boundary between them, to show how
they interact with each other, and to show how
they ultimately support one another as the two
components of a single overarching unity. That
overarching unity is consumer choice. Antitrust
and consumer protection law share a common
purpose in that both are intended to facilitate
the exercise of consumer sovereignty or effective consumer choice. Such consumer choice
exists when two fundamental conditions are
present: (l) there must be a range of consumer
options made possible through competition; and
(2) consumers must be able to select freely
among these options.
The boundary between antitrust and consumer protection is best defmed by reference to
these two elements of consumer choice. The
antitrust laws are intended to ensure that the
marketplace remains competitive, so that a
meaningful range of options is made available
to consumers, unimpaired by practices such as
price fixing or anticompetitive mergers. I The
consumer protection laws are intended to
ensure that consumers can select effectively
from among those options with their critical
faculties unimpaired by such violations as
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deception or the withholding of material information. Protection by both the antitrust and
consumer protection laws is needed to ensure
that a market economy can continue to operate
effectively.
This protection is needed when "market
failures" arise, which may create or permit
competition or consumer protection problems.
This article will demonstrate that antitrust
violations (which impair the menu of options)
stem from market failures in the general marketplace external to consumers, whereas
consumer protection violations (which impair
the individual's ability to select) flow from
internal market failures that take place, in a
sense, "inside the consumer's head."2 While
this formula appears on its face to be of Doric
simplicity, it provides a coherent theoretical
framework from which antitrust and consumer
protection law may be better understood and
applied.
This framework has not only theoretical
interest, but also at least four significant practical consequences. First, a unified theory of
antitrust and consumer protection law will
assist the enforcement authorities in determining when particular conduct or transactions
should be pursued on antitrust as opposed to
consumer protection grounds. Many concrete
aspects and effects of a litigation vary according to whether it is classified as an antitrust or a
consumer protection matter. For example, only
antitrust violations give rise to criminal sanctions and automatic treble damages, and only in
consumer protection cases is the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC" or "Commission") required to use certain rule making and investigatory procedures. A unified theory will make
clear when antitrust or consumer protection
laws should be utilized. Second, the importance
of marketplace options in consumer choice
suggests that antitrust should devote more
attention than it now does to the role of non-

1998

price competition. In certain sectors of the
economy, such as high-tech or media-related
industries, diversity of options may be far more
important to consumers than price competition.
Third, because consumer choice is important,
consumer protection actions should be limited
to conduct that has a reasonably clear effect on
consumers' ability to select, and such actions
should not be brought against conduct that is
objectionable on less clearly defmed moral or
equitable grounds. Finally, our framework
should be useful to those countries that are
establishing or reorganizing trade regulation
programs for the fIrst time.
The discussion of our proposed unified
theory will be divided into four principal
sections. The fIrst section introduces and
defInes the concept of effective consumer
choice, which requires both the existence of
consumer options and the ability to select
among these options. The second section
reviews antitrust and consumer protection case
law and shows that this law is consistent with
(and explicable by) an option-oriented model of
consumer choice. The third section identifIes
and discusses the economic market failures that
may tend to impede the exercise of consumer
choice by restricting either the menu of options
or consumers' ability to select among them.
Finally, the fourth section explores the practical
implications and consequences of our proposed
framework. Among these consequences, the
framework suggests that antitrust law should be
construed somewhat more broadly than in the
past, and consumer protection law somewhat
more narrOWly.

An Option-Oriented Concept
of Consumer Choice

I.

Simply put, consumer choice or consumer
sovereignty is the state of affairs that prevails
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or should prevail in a modem free-market
economy. It is the set of societal arrangements
that cause that economy to act primarily in
response to the aggregate signals of consumer
demand, rather than in response to government
directives or the preferences of individual
businesses. It is the state of affairs in which the
consumer is truly "sovereign," in the sense of
having the power to define his or her own
wants and the ability to satisfy those wants at
prices not greatly in excess of the costs borne
by the providers of the relevant goods and
services. 3 The concept of consumer sovereignty goes so far as to embody at least some
implicit notions about the proper relationship
between the individual and the state; it is part of
the Western world's answer to the prescriptions
of Marxism.
The essence of consumer sovereignty is the
exercise of choice. By choosing some goods or
some options over others, consumers satisfy
their own wants and send signals to the
economy. It is, therefore, critical that the
exercise of consumer choice be protected.
We have already seen that effective consumer choice requires two things: options in
the marketplace and the ability to select freely
among them. To tum this conceptual paradigm
into operational policy, at least some rough
degree of quantification is required. Just how
many options must be present in the market?
Just how free from external influences must
consumers be? In an imperfect world, of
course, the answers to these questions must be
standards of sufficiency rather than standards of
perfection. In other words, we look for enough
options and enough freedom to ensure that the
choices are right (i.e., welfare-maximizing)
most of the time. That approach does not
prevent unsatisfactory outcomes in some
individual cases, but it should ensure that
unsatisfactory options are weeded out fairly
quickly.
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Thus, we do not simply require the maximum number of options. Antitrust law does not
prevent all conduct or transactions that have the
effect of reducing the number of options available to consumers. Nor does the law affirmatively require the creation of options. Rather, it
prevents business conduct that artificially limits
the natural range of options in the marketplace. 4 Indeed, the law permits even some
artificial reductions, such as some mergers, if
the benefits of the action appear to outweigh
the costs. Through these means, the antitrust
laws aim to preserve a sufficient, although not a
perfect, array of options for consumers to
choose among.
Consumer protection laws are similar in the
sense that they seek to protect the ability of
consumers to make rational choices among
competing options but do not necessarily strive
to ensure that consumers have perfect information. 5 Probably no consumer is a perfect reasoning machine, existentially free from all the
extraneous influences of early upbringing,
cultural values, or half-remembered advertising
campaigns from years ago. What we ask of
consumer protection law is therefore something
relatively modest. We ask that consumers be
enabled to make rational choices to the extent
that they wish to concentrate on doing so.
Consumer protection law ensures that buyers
are protected from coercion, deception, and
other influences that are difficult to evade or to
guard against, but it does not protect buyers
from the milder, knowable influences of things
like "image" advertising, which they could set
aside if they desired.
As protected by these two principles, the
exercise of consumer choice should be beneficial to consumers in a number of concrete
ways. It will support and lead to an efficient
economic market. 6 That, in tum, will tend to
produce an environment offering the lowest
prices, the best product quality and variety, the
Volume 10, number 1
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highest degree of consumer surplus, optimal
levels of innovation, and all the other benefits
of a competitive economy.7

II.
Case Law Embodies This
Option-Oriented Approach to
Consumer Choice
Antitrust and consumer protection case law
generally follows the pattern that a consumerchoice model would suggest. The antitrust case
law can be explained in terms of protecting the
supply of options in the market, and the consumer protection case law can be explained in
terms of protecting the ability to select among
the available options. The model that we are
presenting thus becomes a means of explaining,
interpreting, and applying a long line of legal
precedents.
We demonstrate this thesis under two headings. The first discusses the law of antitrust by
first identifying the main functional areas of
antitrust such as collusion, mergers, and vertical restraints. It then shows that the law in each
of these areas addresses a reduction in marketplace options. Under the second heading, we
conduct a similar assessment of consumer
protection law. We identify the basic substantive topics in this area of the law, such as
deception or failure to disclose material information, and then show how these topics all
address conduct that affects the ability to select
among options.
For most practices that violate the antitrust or
consumer protection laws, the dichotomy this
article identifies will neatly separate and distinguish the two fields of antitrust and consumer
protection law. Predatory pricing and price
fixing, for example, overwhelmingly affect the
supply of options rather than choice among
them. They are, therefore, antitrust violations.
Fraud and deception, on the other hand, do not
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directly affect the supply of options, but rather
the ability to choose among them. They are
therefore consumer protection violations. Most
cases are relatively easy to classify in this
way.8

A.
Antitrust Violations Reduce
Consumers' Options
Traditional antitrust violations - such as
price fixing and related horizontal restraints,
anticompetitive mergers, unreasonable vertical
restraints, and predatory pricing - fit well into
our model of consumer choice. Those violations can distort the supply of options by
imposing restrictions on the variety of prices
and products that the free market would offer.
The antitrust laws have banned that restrictive
conduct.
Price fixing and other illegal horizontal
restraints 9 artificially restrict the array of price
options the competitive market would otherwise provide. 1O Price fixing prevents consumers from choosing the best price (or best quality- or variety-adjusted price) that would
otherwise have been available. 11
Mergers are another traditional antitrust
violation that has effects on the range of options
available to consumers, both directly in the
short term, and indirectly in the long term. An
anticompetitive horizontal merger can directly
eliminate significant competition by diminishing options with respect to price, product
quality, or product variety. It can also have the
long-run or indirect effect of making industrywide collusion easier or more probable,12 thus
leading to the elimination of still more options
that consumers might prefer.
Resale price maintenance ("RPM") and other
vertical restraints can also have the effect of
limiting consumer options. RPM directly
restricts the price options open to consumers,
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limiting them to the manufacturer's preferred
price. 13 Non-price restraints, such as exclusive
dealing and exclusive territories, have similar
effects, often significantly restricting downstream firms in the choices that they can offer
to consumers. 14
Predatory pricing similarly interferes with
the array of options that a competitive market
would present. 15 Predatory pricing occurs
when a fIrm prices goods below cost in hopes
?f driving rivals out of the market, discouragmg entry of new fIrms and/or extending the
fIrm's monopoly power. Predatorily low prices
are good for consumers only in the short run. In
the long run,16 such prices threaten to eliminate
fIrms that are providing alternatives that consumers would actually prefer.
A focus on options also explains why certain
practices that raise rivals' costs are undesirable.17 The rivals' higher costs force the victims to raise their prices (or reduce their .investment in product improvement and innovation),
which enables the predator to raise its own
prices (or reduce option-enhancing investment
in research and innovation).18 The consumers
thus lose the option of purchasing better or
more competitively priced products.
Depending on the specifIc antitrust principle
involved, improper restrictions on consumer
options may occur either directly as a result of
fIrms' actions vis-a-vis their customers, or
indirectly as a result of fIrms' actions vis-a-vis
their competitors. For example, if a fIrm with
market power over a product will sell it only
when packaged with a second product,
consumers' options are directly reduced and
distorted. The fIrm's action vis-a-vis its customers may be condemned as an illegal tying
arrangement. Alternatively, suppose that a fIrm
merges with all of its competitors and then
raises prices to a monopoly leveL While mon.opoly pricing and the production of only a
smgle brand is not illegal, the process by which
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the fIrm acquired this power to constrain
options certaillly might be. The fIrm's actions
vis-a-vis its competitors may then be condemned as involving anticompetitive mergers.
In short, antitrust law can best be understood
as a way of protecting the variety of consumer
options in the marketplace.

B.
Consumer Protection Violations Impair Consumers' Ability to
Select Among Options
Consumer protection cases are similarly
explicable as a means of safeguarding the
ability of consumers 19 to select among the
options that the market provides. Thus, for
example, the FTC has found that false or
misleading statements about objective product
characteristics are impermissible. It has acted to
prevent such misrepresentation in claims
involving the materials from which a product is
made,20 the functions that it can perform,21 or
the effectiveness with which it can perform
them. 22 The FTC has been emphatic about this
choice-oriented approach: "The Commission
does not ordinarily seek to mandate specifIc
conduct or specifIc social outcomes, but rather
seeks to ensure simply that markets operate
freely, so that consumers can make their own
decisions."23 Misinformation on any of these
basic points will, of course, tend to prevent a
customer from making the most appropriate
choice from among the options in the marketplace.
The importance of choice in consumer
protection matters is particularly well illustrated by one special class of cases, which
involve misrepresentations regarding the collateral, social, or business attributes of a fIrm.
Some cases of this sort may involve false or
misleading claims that a particular product is
Volume 10, number 1
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environmentally benign or was produced in an
environmentally friendly manner.24 Other cases
involve the improper use of the "Made in
U.S.A." designation. Information on these
points is psychologically important to many
consumers, even though it does not bear directly on operational product characteristics.
For example, while some consumers regard the
fact that a product was domestically manufactured as an indirect indication of product
quality, many other consumers may prefer to
purchase domestic products with only the
patriotic goal of supporting the American
economy. By determining that misrepresentations on these subjects are improper, the FTC
has made it clear that the impairment of the
ability to choose among options is a harm in
itself, and that no more concrete economic
harm needs to be shown.
The consumer protection case law thus can
be understood as addressing concern over the
impairment of the buyer's ability to select from
among the market's options provided.25 The
centrality of this element is underscored by the
FTC's Policy Statement on Deception,26 which
states that one prerequisite to liability for
deception is that the alleged misrepresentation
is "material," meaning that it "is likely to affect
a consumer's choice of, or conduct regarding, a
product. ;'27

III. Market Failures Can
Threaten Consumer Choice
Consumer sovereignty is the state of affairs
in which consumers have an unimpaired ability
to make decisions in their individual interests,
and markets operate efficiently in responding to
the collective effect of those decisions. These
market mechanisms can fail for a variety of
reasons, however, leading to an impairment of
consumer choice. Some of these market fail-
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ures are external to the consumer, or "outside
the head," leading to an inability of the market
to provide sufficient options. Other failures are
internal to the consumer, or "inside the head,"
in the sense that they make the consumer
unable to effectively select among the available
options.
Antitrust and consumer protection law may
be viewed, in economic terms, as intended to
identify and compensate for these two types of
market failures. 28 By so doing, they are again
seen, this time through the lens of economics,
as helping to attain the ultimate goal of consumer choice.
In the discussion that follows, we will fIrst
explain what is meant by a "market failure"
generally, and then will discuss the specifIc
market failures that are of concern to antitrust
and to consumer protection.

A.

Market Failures Defined

It is axiomatic that perfect competition, the
perfect functioning of a competitive market,
will maximize the welfare of consumers.29
Markets that diverge significantly from perfect
competition may not do so. If a market's
characteristics differ dramatically from those
required for perfect competition, "market
failure" can result. The overall level of consumer welfare may then be far below what it
otherwise would be, and wealth that Congress
assigned to consumers may be "unfairly"
acquired by fIrms with market power.
Although economists generally agree on the
fundamental concept of perfect competition,
there is no universally agreed upon list of
factors that defIne perfect competition or whose
absence may lead to market failure. A leading
scholar of the subject, Professor Edwin
MansfIeld, believes that perfect competition
requires four conditions: (1) product homoge-
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neity; (2) a relatively small number of buyers
and sellers; (3) mobile resources; (4) and
perfect information. 3o Professor Jack
Hirshleifer has considered the converse situation and found a list of three possible imperfections that can prevent a market from functioning perfectly, including imperfect information,
time lags, and transaction costS.31 Significant
problems in any of these areas can cause
competition to be suboptimal. Despite disputes
over taxonomy,32 a basic list of factors that can
plausibly cause competition to become suboptimal is relatively noncontroversial. 33

Except on rare occasions, ultimate consumers
have no choice but to deal with a cartel or
monopoly (or else to move to a less-desirable
substitute); it generally is not cost effective for
an individual consumer to build his or her own
factory.
By thus subdividing market failures into
those taking place "inside" and "outside" the
head of ultimate consumers, we make the
categories of our economic analysis most
nearly congruent with the kinds of consumer
choice problems that are of concern to antitrust
enforcement agencies.

B.
Market Failures Subdivided
Into Those External and Internal to
Consumers

C.
Antitrust Violations Require
Market Failures External to
Consumers

The market failures that permit antitrust
The market failures identified in the previous
section in general terms can be divided into two violations all take place in the world external to
types. The fIrst take place "outside the head" of the consumer. Without such market failures, as
the ultimate consumer of the product or service this term was broadly defIned above, there
could be no antitrust violations that signifiat issue and involve imperfections in the extercantly
harm consumer welfare.
nal market. These failures can lead to a reduced
In a perfect, frictionless world, businesses
choice of options and to antitrust problems. The
could still meet and fIx prices. This would
second type of market failures take place
"inside the consumer's head." They involve the result in a technical violation of the antitrust
laws and even in criminal penalties. 34 But, the
consumer's imperfect ability to process inforviolation could not substantially harm consumer
mation and to distinguish the true from the
false. These failures can lead to a reduced
welfare because perfect information among
ability to select among options and to consumer businesses would allow some to quickly enter
the price-fIxed markets and compete away
protection problems.
supracompetitive margins.
A consumer is affected to different degrees
by these two kinds of market failures. The
What makes antitrust injury possible in these
model economic consumer - all- knowing,
circumstances is the presence of external
all-rational, and supremely intelligent - is not
market failures. Market imperfections such as
search costs, faulty information, time lags, and
vulnerable to consumer protection violations.
sunk costs can enable a cartel to keep prices
But even this hypothetical "perfect" consumer
elevated for a significant period.
could be vulnerable to antitrust violations. No
External market failures may be necessary
consumer, no matter how astute, experienced,
for the existence of anticompetitively low
or well-informed, can protect him- or herself
against a cartel or illegally acquired monopoly. pricing as well as for anticompetitively high
50 • Loyola Consumer Law Review
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prices. 35 The most straightforward form of
D.
Consumer Protection Violapredatory pricing - deep-pocket predationtions Require Market Failures
requires that there be a flaw in the capital
Internal to Consumers
market, for without such a flaw the victim
would be able to secure a loan and ride out the
Similarly, consumer protection problems
period of below-cost pricing. 36 Indeed, for
cannot occur absent market failures occurring
every possible predation strategy, a counter"inside the head" of
strategy could probably
ultimate consumers.
be devised by a suffiMarket imperfections such as Hypothetical consumciently informed and
search costs, faulty information, ers who are perfectly
astute competitor or
informed, rational,
time lags, and sunk costs can enable and intelligent can
potential victim. 37
a cartel to keep prices elevated for a never be subject to
Other antitrust cases
involve practices that
significant period.
consumer protection
take advantage of, even
abuses. Ordinary
if they do not cause or
consumers, however,
exacerbate, market imperfections. For example, can have greater difficulties.
imperfect information led to the anticompetitive
The most common internal market failures
use of resale price maintenance in In re Levi
revealed by the FfC's experience fall into five
Strauss & CO. 38 When jeans were a relatively
categories. (1) Some consumers are subject to
new product for middle-class consumers, Levi
coercion and cannot act with free will. (2)
Strauss had to use resale price maintenance to
Other consumers are members of a vulnerable
guarantee retailer margin and in effect buy shelf group (such as children) and are not always
space. 39 During this period, consumers' imper- able to make rational decisions. Still other
fect information concerning this relatively new
consumers will be acting rationally and with
product led to the procompetitive imposition of free will, but will be vulnerable to exploitation
resale price maintenance. Mter the product was due to any of several types of information
well established, however, resale price mainteproblems: (3) information that is wrong, (4)
nance was no longer needed, and Levi Strauss
information that is incomplete, or (5) informaanticompetitively kept prices at too high a
tion that is unduly hard to process. Virtually
level. 40 Imperfect information on the part of
every consumer protection concern can be
Levi Strauss caused the company to fail to
understood in terms of one or more of these
realize that it should have changed marketing
five types of internal market failure.
strategies. It maintained a resale price mainteThe first of the above mentioned market
nance strategy longer than was optimal for
failures involves situations in which an indisociety, or for Levi Strauss.
vidual cannot exercise free will. This situation
Some of the market failures discussed above can arise most obviously when individuals have
directly impact individuals, and some impact
been subjected to overt coercion. Such cases
businesses. Regardless of who the ultimate
are rare but they do exist. One arose when a
consumers are, however, the failures in all
furnace company adopted the practice of
these antitrust cases are external to such conhaving its salesmen disassemble a homeowner's
sumers.
heating unit for "inspection" and then refuse to
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reassemble it until the homeowner agreed to
buy additional parts or services.41
A second type of market failure involves
situations in which consumers are members of
vulnerable groups, and thus are susceptible to
undue influence by sellers. For example,
certain lottery techniques for selling candy have
been found improper in part because they were
aimed at "children, too young to be capable of
exercising an intelligent judgment of the transaction. . . ."42
By far the most important type of consumer
protection market failure involves consumers
who are capable of rational decisions, but
whose decision making abilities have been
impaired by incorrect information. A
manufacturer's use of false or misleading
information is perhaps the greatest single threat
to the free exercise of consumer choice. Therefore, both the FfC Act and other general
prohibitions separately and specifically ban
unfair consumer practices.43
A related type of "inside the head" market
failure can arise if sellers withhold particularly
important information, not readily available
elsewhere, that consumers need in order to
make informed comparisons. The FfC has
issued several rules addressing such problems.
These have required manufacturers to disclose
the most basic functional characteristics of their
products such as the R-value of insulation and
the octane rating of gasoline. 44
The fIfth class of market failures can be
thought of as a specialized subset of the fourth.
Both Congress and the FfC seek to protect
consumers against information disclosures that
are in a form too difficult for consumers to
process and apply. Credit reporting laws, for
example, mandate disclosure that a payment of
$100 per month of interest on a certain principal amount for four years really equals a 22%
rate of interest. These laws make it easier for
consumers of credit to engage in comparison
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shopping. Like the fourth category, the focus
here is on giving the consumer not only accurate information, but also accurate information
that is reasonably complete and useable.
All fIve of these categories are consistent
with our consumer sovereignty model of the
consumer protection laws. They all tend to
address types of market failures that occur
"inside the consumer's head" and tend to
impede the consumer's ability to choose from
among the available options.

IV. Practical Consequences of a
Unified Theory
The view of the law outlined in the previous
sections of the article is of more than theoretical interest. It also has a number of intensely
practical implications. Four of those implications will be discussed in this section. First, a
unifIed theory of consumer sovereignty helps
ensure that the litigation in each case will
follow the procedures and standards set out in
the appropriate part of the statute. Second, a
modified theory modestly extends the scope of
antitrust law by reminding the legal community
of the important role played by non-price
competition. Third, it modestly limits the scope
of consumer protection law by focusing attention on conduct that impairs the ability to
select, rather than on conduct that is "unfair" in
some broader sense. Finally, it suggests a
conceptual framework to countries that are
adopting or organizing fair competition laws
for the fIrst time.

A.
Jurisdictional Coverage of the
Antitrust and Consumer Protection
Laws Can Be Clarified
Our dichotomy will make the defInitions of
antitrust and consumer protection law more
Volume 10, number 1
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rigorous, which in tum will assist government
B.
Non-Price Competition
officials in deciding under which theory to
pursue a particular problem. This determination Should Become a Higher Priority
for Antitrust Enforcement
is important for three reasons.
First, Sherman Act antitrust violations can
A second implication of this article's analysis
lead to criminal penalties,45 and virtually every
is that the antitrust laws should focus on proantitrust violation can lead to automatic treble
tecting consumer options generally, not just low
damages.46 In light of these relatively heavy
price options in particular. Expressed differpenalties, it only seems fair to articulate more
ently, it suggests that the interpretation of the
clearly which type of actions are antitrust
antitrust laws should be mildly expanded to
actions.
take a somewhat greater account of non-price
Second, the decision on which statute to
competition.
apply has many practical consequences for the
The enforcement agencies have already
development and conduct of a case. It will
recognized the importance of preserving nonaffect the procedures the parties will follow, the
price options in sufficiently clear circumremedies that are available, and which enforcestances. They have certainly recognized that
ment staff will have jurisdiction over a case.
fIrms can compete on dimensions other than
For example, the FTC has been given special
price. Non-price competition can ~e extre.mely
.
procedures for use in rule m aking 47 an d In
important
to both commercial and Industnal .
consumer redress48 in consumer protection
purchasers. Such competition can take place In
cases but not for use in antitrust matters. The
terms of innovation, scheduling, service,
FTC is similarly required to use civil investigaconvenience, or product variety. Such factors
tive demands ("CIDs") in most consumer
can be especially important in particular indus. antltrus
.
t matters. 49
protection cases but not In
tries.
Properly assessing the type of case involved
At certain times in the past, for example, the
will determine which of these procedures
airlines appeared to compete in large part in
should be used.
terms of scheduling and convenience, and
Third, our dichotomy can help determine
members of the motion picture industry comwhether the main substantive charge in a
pete in terms of product innovation. Similarly,
particular matter has been framed under the
consents in several recent pharmaceutical
proper provision of law. This will help prosecumerger cases have resolved FTC concerns that
tors ensure that a matter has been brought using
mergers might impair competition, not in
the proper terms, and by the right enforcer, and
current business, but rather in the innovation of
thus may protect against motions to dismiss.
future products. 50 These concerns mayor may
Conversely, familiarity with these issues may
not be readily expressed in terms of price, but
help members of the defense bar to secure the
they definitely involve the range of choice that
dismissal of actions that have been brought
might become available in the marketplace and
under an improper legal heading.
thus are most easily comprehended under a
formula that focuses on the factor of choice.
Indeed, in some products, quality competition may be the most important dimension to
consumers. In the market for bulletproof vests,
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for example, buyers certainly care much more
about product reliability than about product
price. For this reason, the FTC was concerned
when an association of bulletproof vest manufacturers adopted a rule restricting comparative
advertising. The association's rule had declared
that it was unethical for any member to represent that another member's vests had failed
certification testing even if the advertising
claim was true. The FTC sought and accepted
a consent agreement against this practice
because elimination of the advertising ban
would tend to foster useful quality competition. 51
In more ordinary antitrust cases, however,
where the elimination of non-price competition
is not so obviously central to the violation, the
enforcement agencies have sometimes tended
to de-emphasize this factor. For example, the
conventional antitrust analysis under Section 7
of the Clayton Act concentrates almost exclusively on the price effects of a merger, concluding that the merger is to be condemned if it is
likely to lead to higher prices. Even if the
merger has no significant effect on price,
however, an anticompetitive merger might
adversely affect consumers with respect to
other forms of competition. A focus on consumer choice as a goal will make it easier for
enforcement agencies to consider the merger's
effects in these areas. Moreover, given that
competition in these dimensions might be
affected at concentration levels different from
those most relevant for pure price considerations, attention to consumer choice may
sometimes suggest challenges to mergers that
would not otherwise be illegal.
This would represent a change of emphasis
from traditional merger analysis. Although
merger analysis makes pro forma bows toward
other dimensions of competition, the analysis
promptly returns to price. The Horizontal
Merger Guidelines, for example, have a section

54 • Loyola Consumer Law Review

entitled "Purpose and Underlying Policy
Assumptions of the Guidelines, 52 which
contains roughly a dozen references in the text
to "price," the "transfer of wealth from buyers
to sellers," and similar monetary concepts. 53
Only a single footnote in the guidelines suggests that merger policy includes non-monetary
concerns. 54 The National Association ofAttorneys' General (HNAAG") State Merger Guidelines reflect a similar emphasis.55 Both the
federal and NAAG Merger Guidelines therefore permit consideration of non-price elements
of competition, but both are structured in such a
way as not to particularly encourage use of that
consideration.
Some elements of non-price competition
might be captured through use of the concept of
"quality-adjusted price." Again, however,
neither Guideline is structured to particularly
encourage that approach. Moreover, "qualityadjusted price" may be a difficult concept to
apply in concrete situations where the non-price
components of competition are particularly
important or where they take subtle or complex
forms.
Consider, for example, an industry making
men's neckties. If this industry was to consolidate through merger to a non-competitive
number of fIrms, the price might not rise. The
fIrms might instead hold prices steady but
invest less money in high-quality materials or in
staying abreast of fashion. 56 In theory, one
could say that the quality-adjusted price of a tie
would have risen since a less-desirable product
would then be offered at the same price as
before. 57 This formulation is not particularly
useful, however, since, in the absence of market prices for the (nonexistent) high-quality
ties, antitrust enforcers cannot know the quantitative extent of the implicit price rise that has
occurred. (What is the value of fashion?)
Rather than trying to force the analysis into
price terms for which we lack the necessary
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data, therefore, it will sometimes be simpler
and more effective to frame the analysis directly in terms of quality, diversity, and
choice. 58
This issue must be approached with caution,
however, because, where price competition still
exists, it will often serve as a reasonably good
proxy for non-price competition. Once a
particular market is price-competitive, in other
words, it may often offer self-equilibrating
levels of competition in other dimensions as
well. Consider, for example, a post-merger
market that is price-competitive but that, as the
result of a merger, no longer produces the
optimum level of product variety. If consumers
truly want more variety, and if the fIrms are
truly competitive, then they will soon begin to
extend their product lines by introducing a
greater number of models and variants to the
market.
Sometimes, however, price competition
alone may provide consumers insufficient
protection. 59 This problem is most likely to
arise with respect to certain kinds of intellectual
property, some of which can playa competitive
role only in an environment of organizational
independence.
The most important option of this sort may
be the independent editorial programming of a
communications medium. If one communications medium were to buy another of the same
kind, the acquisition might not concentrate the
market sufficiently to threaten price competition. Being competitive, the market might also
soon produce the product menu that consumers
desire in terms of types and formats of shows.
But the market will have inevitably sustained a
loss of editorial diversity, and this cannot be
recreated through the normal mechanism of
non-price competition among the surviving
fIrms; the new products would necessarily bear
the editorial stamp of their common owner.
This suggests that media mergers should be
1998

carefully scrutinized for loss of non-price
competition along the dimension of diversity in
programming and, where that loss is sufficiently severe,60 that they be challenged under
the Clayton Act, even if there has been no
showing of harm to price competition.
Suppose, for example, the country had only
fIve book publishers, and that two of them
merged. This might not lead to a loss of price
competition or to a narrowing in the range of
price options. 61 On the other hand, it might
well lead to a quantifIable loss of editorial
diversity and thus to a narrowing of the competing marketplace options expressed in terms
of the types of titles offered. An antitrust suit
might properly challenge this result. This suit
would not seek to apply a special standard for
the media that is based on First Amendment or
diversity considerations. 62 Rather, it would be
based on the ordinary, universal standards of
Section 7, once that section has been properly
construed to recognize the role of options and
of non-price competition.

C.
Consumer Protection Should
Focus More Closely on Conduct
that Impairs Choice
If our model of consumer choice suggests
that antitrust law should be modestly expanded,
it also suggests that the scope of consumer
protection should be modestly contracted. The
consumer choice model suggests that unfair
consumer practices should be limited to those
that have a more or less demonstrable effect on
consumers' ability to exercise effective selection, and that the concept should not be extended to conduct that is thought to be "unfair"
on more general, less predictable moral or
equitable grounds.
In this respect, the consumer choice or
consumer sovereignty model supports and
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ratifies a trend that has been underway for the
last twenty years. At the beginning of that
period, the FfC was following a construction
articulated in its "Cigarette Rule," which stated
that consumer unfairness was defined by
reference to three broad factors: (1) "public
policy;" (2) whether the conduct was "immoral,
unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous;" and
(3) whether the conduct caused substantial
injury to consumers.63 Since then, the definition
of consumer unfairness has progressively
narrowed. In a 1980 Policy Statement, the FfC
declared that it would no longer rely on the test
of immoral or unethical conduct. 64 The FfC
believed that this test was merely duplicative of
the others and had never supplied an independent basis for action. In 1994, Congress declared that a second element in the Cigarette
Rule - established public policies - could
likewise no longer be used as independent
grounds for finding conduct unfair. This factor
would henceforth be used only in conjunction
with other evidence and presumably in order to
confirm a finding of consumer injury.65 The
grounds established in the Cigarette Rule have
thus been narrowed to the single primary factor
of injury, and an actionable injury of that sort
has increasingly been defined as one that
manifests itself through the mechanism of
impaired consumer ability to select. 66
Consumer protection jurisdiction can be
more narrowly expressed in this way without
concern that the agency will become unable to
reach some significant number of meritorious
cases. If conduct is truly "oppressive" or
"contrary to public policy," then it will almost
certainly affect consumer choice.
Telemarketing worthless securities to the
elderly, for example, while surely oppressive,
also involves actionable elements of deception.
Conversely, if some conduct cannot be characterized as harmful to choice, then there is a
good chance that it is something that the gov-
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ernment should not try to control. Consider
image advertising that associates use of a
particular toothpaste with youth and vitality.
This association may lead to purchases that are
"irrational" by objective standards, but, if
consumers freely elect to place a high value on
the intangible attributes of a product, that is a
market decision that should be respected.

D. Countries Establishing or
Reorganizing Trade Regulation
Programs Can Do So in a More
Beneficial Manner
Many nations currently are deciding whether
to establish or reorganize trade regulation
programs and, if so, which legal areas should
be the subject of concern and how the different
parts of these programs should relate to one
another. The framework suggested here should
help with this task and may also help these
governments explain the programs in a relatively coherent way to their citizens.
A legislature writing on a clean slate might
wish to express its trade laws specifically in
choice-oriented terms. 67 A statute embodying
this approach could be worded as follows:
It is the national policy to foster an
economy in which consumers can make
free choices among goods and services
in a competitive marketplace. Conduct
that unreasonably impairs this goal is
hereby declared illegal. It is specifically
illegal to engage in: (1) A, B, C, and
any other conduct that unreasonably
limits the range of competitive options
that would otherwise have been present
in the market; and (2) X, Y, Z, and any
other conduct that unreasonably impairs
consumers' ability to select among
these options.
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A legislature enacting this statute would
complete it by filling in the blanks for ABC and
XYZ with those specific items that the country
was confident it wished to ban in light of its
own national experience. If the United States
was using this approach, for example, it would
include specific bans on such things as monopolization, mergers that may substantially
lessen competition, and deception.
A statute along these lines would have
several attractive features. The specific prohibitions would give the business community as
much notice as the nature of the subject matter
permits. At the same time, the general residual
clauses, written in terms of options and the
ability to select among them, would preserve
the flexibility necessary to deal with changing
conditions. 68 In this respect, our model statute
would be similar to a combination of the
Sherman Act and the FTC Act in American
law.
The proposed model seems to be an improvement over the present combination in two
important respects, however. First, by putting
the specific and the general clauses in a single
statute, it encourages the enforcers and the
judiciary to employ general principles to guide
the development and application of the specific
prohibitions. The statute itself, in other words,
would set out internal, general principles of
construction that would provide a context
within which the specific provisions will be
interpreted in the proper manner. Second, even
the general clauses would be framed in a
relatively objective way. Conduct would be
banned, not on grounds of "unfairness" (the
approach used in the FTC Act), which can
cause considerable judicial uncertainty, but
because of its unreasonable effects on the
exercise of consumer choice. The underlying
concept of consumer choice will tend to focus
the inquiry. Even though the concept of "unreasonable" effects on choice still leaves room for
1998

interpretation, this uncertainty would tend to be
limited to questions of degree - identifying
the threshold level of net effect that becomes
actionable - rather than leaving the door open
to broader uncertainty about what kinds of
harm are improper.
Perhaps the greatest advantage of a choiceoriented statute is that it would help governments explain to their citizens - particularly
those businesses and individuals who are
relatively inexperienced at dealing with a
market economy - why a system of competitive capitalism is in their best interests.

VI.

Conclusion

Trade regulation law is ultimately about
choice, and choice is ultimately about options
- getting them, keeping them, and selecting
among them. The disciplines of antitrust and
consumer protection law are best defined in
terms of their roles in this process. An antitrust
violation may be understood as an activity that
unreasonably distorts or restricts the options
that otherwise would be available to consumers. A consumer protection violation may be
understood as activity that unreasonably interferes with consumer selection among the
options provided in the marketplace. These two
fields of law, acting together, give consumers
the tools they need to effectively exercise
consumer sovereignty.
A number of benefits should flow from this
unified conception of the trade regulation
laws. 69 It should make lawyers practicing in
these disciplines more alert to the possibility
that a case focusing on one element of consumer choice will also raise issues involving
the other element. It also suggests that econo- .
mists practicing primarily in one field should
gain insights from the other. For example,
economists have perhaps tended to be most
comfortable as a discipline with the hard,
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"objective" market imperfections involved in
antitrust, and to be less comfortable with the
more subjective and sociological kinds of
"inside the head" failures that mark the typical
consumer protection matter. Both types of
market failures seem to be of equal importance,
so both would seem equally deserving of
professional study..
The final purpose of this article has been to
help focus the attention of both fields on options - a shift in focus from the current administrative and judicial emphasis on price. Although price competition often is of utmost
importance to consumer welfare, so too is the
variety, quality, safety, service and innovation
of new products. These attributes have sometimes been treated as afterthoughts when they
actually should be at the forefront of debate and
analysis in this important area of the law.

Endnotes
Not every activity that unreasonably distorts or
restricts the options that otherwise would be open to
consumers is an antitrust violation, however. The activity
in question must also violate a specific antitrust statute.
Similarly, not everything that unreasonably interferes with
consumers' ability to choose among the available options
is a consumer protection violation. The activity also must
violate a specific consumer protection principle.
I.

Not every market failure is or should be illegal.
Certain market failures lead to specific activities that
society has made illegal, however, including cartels and
deceptive advertising.
2.

3.
Moreover, each product has a cluster of other
attributes, such as quality, safety, and availability of
related services. The free market will decide the mix of
price, quality, and related attributes that consumers value
most

4.
Some products are withdrawn from the market
because not enough consumers desire to purchase them;
some firms exit the market because they are not as
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innovative or efficient as rival firms; and some firms
disappear through merger because they had not attained a
minimum efficient scale. These processes reflect the
ordinary workings of the marketplace. What antitrust
forbids is conduct that artificially reduces the number of
options directly and without the mediating agency of
consumer choice.
5.
The FTC has the authority to require that certain
fundamental information be make available to consumers
for such purposes as correcting statements that would
otherwise be misleading, or correcting "pure omissions"
in circumstances where doing so would deliver a net
benefit to consumers. The scope of this authority is
limited by several factors, however. There are practical
and equitable limits on how much affirmative disclosure
firms can made. See, e.g., In re International Harvester
Co., 104 F. T. C. 949 (1984) (holding that though
manufacturer's failure to disclose known safety risks in
its tractors was a statutory violation, no remedial action
was needed because the tractor design was no longer
produced and the manufacturer's voluntary notification
program provided as much relief as could be expected.)

6.
Both antitrust and consumer protection statutes
have the goal of enhancing economic efficiency. See
Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and

Primary Concern ofAntitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, passim and
especially at 106-26 (1982). The statutes serve other
economic goals as well. The primary goal of these statutes
is to prevent unfair transfers of wealth from consumers to
firms with market power (the antitrust statutes) or to firms
unfairly acting against consumer interests (the consumer
protection statutes). See id. at 108.
7.
We should add some refinements and complexities to our basic model of consumer sovereignty. In some
cases the "consumers" who need protection from misleading information are actually corporations who may be
buying an industrial input for use in their own operations.
See generally Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical
Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992) (describing independent
service provider's suit against producer of copy machines,
which tied replacement parts to service). In other cases,
the direction in which market power is exercised may be
reversed, and it may be the manufacturers who need help
finding a range of marketplace options. For example, a
manufacturer may confront a single monopsonist, or
confront a cartel of purchasers (or oligopsonists) that have
agreed on a common policy to keep prices low. With
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appropriate adjustments, our concept of consumer
sovereignty can accommodate these different circumstances. For the sake of simplicity, however, in the
discussion that follows we will normally speak in terms of
the most common situation, which is that of ultimate
consumers purchasing from a limited number of manufacturers.
8.
Some situations, however, do not fit so neatly
into our model. The pure dichotomy only deals with
relatively direct effects ofthe practices in question. In the
long run, the effects may interact in more complex ways.
Market failures internal to consumers may eventually lead
to market failures external to consumers, and vice-versa.
Similarly, practices that affect the market's menu of
options can also, in time, affect consumers' ability to
choose among options, which in tum could lead to further
restrictions, or distortions, in the options made available
through the marketplace. These complexities must be
factored into the enforcer's decisions regarding whether
to prosecute and, if so, what remedy to seek. For a
discussion of these interactions see Neil W. Averitt &
Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified
Theory ofAntitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 65
ANrnRUST L.J. 713 (1997) 713, 734-44.

9.
Of course, not every horizontal restraint is
illegal. A joint venture that increases industry-wide
innovation, for example, is generally procompetitive and
legal. See generally 1 ABA SECTION OF ANrnRUST LAW,
ANrnRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 77 (Angland eds., 4th ed.
1997); HERBERT HoVENKAMP, FEDERALANrrmusT POllCY
140-240 (1994).

Price fixing also can, to a small degree, distort
consumer choice. A few consumers might not purchase if
they knew that prices were fixed. The principal reason
why we condemn it, however, is because it eliminates the
option of price competition from the market.
10.

Price fixing also has a number of indirect
anticompetitive effects. It shields inefficient firms from
hard competition. See Lande, supra note 6, at 78-79. It
also causes allocative inefficiency and a transfer of wealth
from consumers to producers. See id. at 72-77.
11.

12.

See HoVENKAMP, supra note 9, at 455-66,479-

88.
13.
For an overview of these effects, see Alan A.
Fisher et al., Do the DOl Vertical Restraints Guidelines
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Provide Guidance?, 32 ANrnRUST BULL. 609,615-23
(1987).
14.
See id. Of course, each of these practices also
can cause significant, potentially offsetting
procompetitive effects. See id. at 615-16. Moreover, these
offsetting efficiencies can sometimes be characterized as
attempts to overcome market failures. See, e.g.,
id. (discussing the point of sale ''free rider" problem). If
they are imposed by firms without market power the
possibility that their anticompetitive effects (i.e., their
option distortions) will be significant is probably quite
small. For this reason, non-price vertical restraints are
judged under a rule of reason standard. See Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977).
Many believe that RPM also should be judged under the
rule of reason or even that it should be deemed per se
legal. See Fisheret al., supra note 13, at 615 n.18. In any
event, it is the possibility of anticompetitive option loss
that makes antitrust law enforcement agencies concerned
with these transactions.

15.
For an excellent discussion of predatory pricing
theory and case law, see James D. Hurwitz & William E.
Kovacic, ludicial Analysis of Predation: The Emerging
Trends, 35 V AND. L. REv. 63 (1982); HoVENKAMP, supra
note 9, at 298-328.

16.
This assumes the existence of effective barriers
to entry, for without them similar firms would be able to
enter and offer the desired options.

17.
See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop,
Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to
Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986).

18.
For a thorough explanation and discussion of
the necessary prerequisites to this conduct, see Thomas G.
Krattenmaker et al., Airlie House Conference on the
Antitrust Alternative: Monopoly Power and Market
Power in Antitrust Law, 76 GEO. L.1. 241, 248-53,265-69
(1987).

19.
Actions that undercut the ability of competing
firms to make free or informed decisions are properly
considered antitrust violations, insofar as these actions
ultimately affect the range of choice that is made available
to the marketplace. For example, predation may be
accomplished through false or deceptive information if an
incumbent firm implements a "noisy" pricing strategy,
which conceals the fact that its low prices are not based
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upon superior efficiency but instead are actually below
cost. Alternatively, a firm could develop an undeserved
reputation for predatory pricing. In both these situations,
the false information is likely to affect the target firm's
offerings to the marketplace rather than its purchases from
the marketplace, and thus raises more antitrust than
consumer protection issues. See infra notes 44-45.
20.
See, e.g., Federal Trade Comm'n v. Algoma
Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934) (holding inferior ''yellow
pine" could not be sold as "white pine"); Federal Trade
Comm'n v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483 (1922)
(ruling clothing made from a part-wool mixture could not
be sold as "wool").

See, e.g., Carter Prods., Inc. v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, 268 E2d 461 (9th Cir. 1959) (describing
situation where laxative pills were misrepresented as a
"natural method of self-treatment, that they contained no
strong medicines, and that they were effective to treat liver
conditions"); Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v.
Federal Trade Comm'n, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944)
(ruling that no cosmetic cream could restore youth and
that it was therefore deceptive to advertise a product as
such).
21.

22.
See. e.g., Continental Wax Corp. v. Federal
Trade Comm'n, 330 E2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964) (holding
that the product name "Continental Six Month Floor
Wax," where unsupportable by empirical evidence, was
deceptive); In re Warner-Lambert Co., 86 ET.C. 1398
(1975), aff'd as modified, 562 F.2d 749 (D.c. Cir. 1977)
(ordering that manufacturer cease and desist from
advertising that it mouthwash "prevented, cured and
alleviated the common cold").

23.

In re International Harvester Co., 104 ET.C. at

1061.
24.
For statutory requirements regarding
envirnomental advertisements, see FTC Guides and Trade
Practice Rules, 16 C.F.R. §§ 260.1-.9 (1998).

25.
The FTC cases cited in the preceding paragraphs
each involved circumstances of deception. Matters
involving the FTC's less frequently invoked consumer
unfairness authority also involve the ability to make free
choices, however. See Averitt & Lande, supra note 8.

26.
See Deceptive Acts and Practices, 4 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) 'II 13,205.
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27.
Id. at 20,916. Although the consumer's "conduct
regarding a product" is treated separately from the initial
purchase decision, the two concep~s are clearly related in
that they both bear on the desirability and utility of the
product, and hence on the choice among options.

28.
This should not be taken to imply that every
practice that has the adverse economic effects of taking
advantage of market failures, distorting options, or
restricting consumer choice is or should be a law violation. Often these effects are insignificant or are outweighed by offsetting pro-competitive benefits. At other
times, practical considerations may suggest that the most
appropriate rule is one that is relatively inexpensive,
predictable, and easy to administer, even if it does not halt
all instances of anticompetitive behavior. For a discussion
of these jurisprudential issues, see Alan A. Fisher &
Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger
Enforcement, 71 CAL. L. REv. 1580,1652-59, 1670-77
(1983); Phillip Areeda, Monopolization, Mergers, and
Markets: A Century Past and the Future, 75 CAL. L. REv.
959,960 (1987) (stating "[a]ntitrust law cannot feasibly
address every deviation from perfect competition .... ").

29.
See EM. SCHERER & DAVID Ross,lNDuSTRIAL
MARKEr STRUCfURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 15-29
(3d ed. 1990).

30.
See EDWIN MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY
& ApPLICATIONS 232-33 (5th ed. 1985).

31.
See JACK HiRSHLEIFER, PRiCE THEORY AND
APPLICATIONS 417-19 (3d ed. 1984).
32.
For example, a marlcet with difficult entry and
with sellers or buyers large enough to affect price could
be said to experience a "physical" market failure. We also
could ask how these firms were able to become so large,
and to characterize the causes (e.g., the imperfect information or transaction costs themselves as "market failures").

33.
For a further discussion of some of the complexities that can arise, including the issues of how often
market failures are likely to occur and how quickly they
will correct themselves, see Averitt & Lande, supra note
8.

34.
See ABA SECTION OF ANrrrRUST LAW, supra note
9, at 219-59.
35.

See Richard o. Zerbe, Jr. & Donald S. Cooper,
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An Empirical and Theoretical Comparison ofAlternative
Predation Rules, 61 TEx. L. REv. 655, 658 (1982).
36.
If information is perfect and a would-be predator
lowers price, an equally efficient competitor will have an
incentive to mothball its plant and reopen it after the
predation ends. If the intended victim runs out of money
in the short run, it can get a loan and repay it out of its
expected future monopoly profits. Since this mothballing
can happen, the antecedent predation will not happen
often. In MatshushitaElectrical Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), the Supreme Court
cited Judge Bork and other Chicago School analysts and
essentially embraced the view that predatory pricing was
an extremely rare phenomenon. The antipredation
scenario might not work, however, if information is
imperfect. Suppose the owner of the mothballed factory
goes to a bank for a loan. The banker probably would say
that - due to imperfect information - he or she was not
certain that the victim was as efficient as the monopolist.
The banker therefore would either deny the loan or would
loan only at an extremely high rate. Thus, if information is
imperfect even old-fashioned deep-pocket predation might
be possible. For a discussion of more complex forms of
predation, including "reputation predation" and "noisy
pricing predation," see Averitt & Lande, supra note 8.
37.
See Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies
and Counterstrategies, 48 U. em. L. REv. 263 (1981).
38.
See In re Levi Strauss & Co., 92 F. T.C. 171
(1978) (Compi. 'II 8).
39.

See Sharon Oster, The FTC v. Levi Strauss: An
Analysis of the Economic Issues, Federal Trade Commission, in IMPACf EVALUATIONS OF FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION VERTICAL RESTRAINT CASES 1, 48 (Ronald N. Lafferty
et al., eds., 1984).
40.

See id.

4\.
See In re Holland Furnace Co., 55 F.T.C. 55
(1958), aff'd, 295 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1961).

42.
See Federal Trade Comm'n v. R.F. Keppel &
Bro., 291 U.S. 304, 309 (1934).

43.
Deception cases, an integral part of the larger
effort to protect consumer sovereignty, are one specific
application of the broad prohibition against "unfair"
consumer practices embodied in Section 5 of the FTC
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Act. See Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of 'Unfair Acts or
Practices'in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, 70 GEO. L.J. 225 (1981).
44.
See Labeling and Advertising of Home Insulation, 16 c.F.R. § 460 (1996) (requiring disclosure ofRvalues); Automotive Fuel Ratings, Certification and
Posting, 16 c.F.R. § 306 (1996) (requiring disclosure of
octane ratings of automoti ve gasoline).

45.

See 15 U.S.c. §§ 1-3 (1996).

46.
See 15 U.S.c. § 15(a) (1996). Some exceptions
exist for those relatively rare events that violate the FTC
Act but not the Sherman or Clayton Acts. See generally
Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of 'Unfair Methods of
Competition' in Section 5 of the Federal trade CommissionAct, 21 B.c.L. REv. 227, 265 (1980).

47.
The FTC Act was amended to provide special,
specific rule making procedures for use "with respect to
unfair or deceptive acts or practices .... " 15 U.S.c. §
57a(a)(I) (1996). The amendment spells out procedures
affecting Federal Register notice, notice to Congress, the
rights that the parties have to present evidence, specific
points to be addressed by the Statement of Basis and
Purpose, and similar matters. See id. at § 57a. The section
further specifies that "[t]he Commission shall have no
authority ... other than its authority under this section, to
prescribe any rule with respect to unfair or deceptive acts
or practices ...." Id. at § 57a(a)(2). Competition rules, in
contrast, may be promulgated through the general
procedures of the Administration Procedures Act. See
National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, 482 F.2d 672 (D.c. Cir. 1973).

48.
Courts are specifically authorized to grant
redress in certain consumer protection matters. An
amendment to the FTC Act states that, where there has
been a violation of a rule involving unfair or deceptive
acts or practices, or certain types of particularly clear
violation of the general consumer protection statutes,
courts "shall have jurisdiction to grant such relief as the
court finds necessary to redress injury to consumers ....
Such relief may include ... rescission or reformation of
contracts, the refund of money or return of property, [or]
the payment of damages .... " 15 U.S.c. § 57b(b) (1996).
Somewhat similar remedial authority, usable in both
competition and consumer protection contexts, has also
been judicially implied as inherent in the courts' equitable
powers to grant injunctions under § 13(b). See Federal
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Trade Comm'n v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1113
(9th Cir. 1982).
49.
CIDs may be used in antitrust matters, although
the antitrust staff generally prefers to rely on conventional
subpoenas. See 15 U.S.C. § 57b-l(a)(7) (1996) ("violation" includes "any antitrust violation"). For most forms
of administrative litigation in consumer protection
matters, however, CIDs must be used as the vehicle for
discovery. "For the purpose of investigations performed
pursuant to this section with respect to unfair or deceptive
acts or practices ... all actions of the Commission [under
certain sections] shall be conducted pursuant to subsection (c) ...." [d. at § 57b-l(b) (1996). That section then
spells out special procedures covering such matters as
oaths, where and how the CIDs are served, in what way
the subjects of the inquiry may be represented by counsel,
and the like. See id. at § 57b-l(c).

See, e.g., Ciba Geigy, Ltd., Analysis to Aid
Public Comment, FTC File No. 961-0055,1997 WL 1540
(Fed. Reg. Jan. 3, 1997) (agreement intended to protect
competition in development and commercialization of
gene therapy treatments) (consent provisionally accepted
Dec. 1996).
50.

51.
See Personal Protective Armor Association, 59
Fed. Reg. 19,019 (1994) (to be reported at 117 F.T.C.
104).

52.
U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade
Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 62 Antitrust
& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) § 0.1, at 107 (April 2, 1992).

53.

See id.

54.
Footnote 6 of the 1992 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines reads, "Sellers with market power also may
lessen competition on dimensions other than price, such
as product quality, service or innovation." [d.

55.
They concede in a footnote that consumers can
be harmed by oligopoly behavior "on terms of trade other
than price." The footnote elaborates this consideration at
somewhat more length than the federal guidelines. It reads
as follows: ''Tacit or active collusion on terms of trade
other than price also produces wealth transfer effects.
This would include, for example, an agreement to
eliminate rivalry on service features or to limit the choices
otherwise available to consumers." See Merger Guidelines 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)«J[ 13,104, § 2.11 n.14, at
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20,573-9 (1992). See also Horizontal Merger Guidelines
4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 'II 13,405, at 21,186 n.17
(March 10, 1987). These Guidelines also declare, more
fundamentally, that the "central purpose" of merger law
"is to prevent ftrms from attaining market or monopoly
power, because ftrms possessing such power can raise
prices to consumers above competitive levels ...." [d. at
21,185.
56.
For purposes of this example, we assume that
the other conditions of the industry, such as entry barriers,
are conducive to an anticompetitive outcome.

57.
In the real world, it is of course also possible
that antitrust enforcers will simply observe the absence of
a price rise and wrongly conclude that no anticompetitive
effects at all have taken place.

58.
Cf. National Macaroni Mfrs. Ass'n. v. Federal
Trade Comm'n, 345 F.2d421 (7thCir.1965) (manufacturers had agreed to use less desirable mix of ingredients).
Other forms of non-price competition may involve
product variety rather than product qUality. Some consumer needs will not be met by even a high-quality
product at a low price if it is the wrong kind of product.
The consumer harm felt here, while real, is also not
particularly well suited to price analysis. For example, a
family of seven might strongly prefer to purchase a van
rather than a conventional car. In an extreme case we can
imagine that after a series of mergers the resulting
automobile monopoly might decide to limit consumer
choice to cars only. This family's welfare will be signiftcantly diminished by the lack of product variety even if
the new cars are priced at a competitive level. Since this
welfare loss cannot be readily quantifted, however,
particularly in the absence of market prices for vans, it
would not seem useful to try evaluating the desirability of
these automobile mergers solely in price terms.

59.
In looking for possible harms to non-price
competition, antitrust decision makers need to be careful
and cautious. The consumer choice model will remind the
antitrust agencies of the relevance of non-price factors,
but it does not alter or expand the actual reach of Section
7. Harms to non-price competition are already covered by
the Clayton Act and have already informed decisions in
merger cases. See, e.g., Federal Trade Comm' n v. PPG
Indus., Inc., 798 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (enjoining
preliminarily the merger of manufacturers of "high
technology" aircraft transparencies, who competed,
among other ways, in new product development).
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60.
Antitrust enforcers could not challenge every
merger involving intellectual property on the grounds that,
by removing the products of the acquired firm as an
independent force in the market, the merger would
necessarily impair consumer choice. True, in some
linguistic sense every merger of a product involving some
element of creativity removes a choice from the market.
The incorporation of Oldsmobile into General Motors
deprived those consumers who preferred the independent
Oldsmobile design department of that choice. This alone
cannot be the basis for illegality, however, for such an
argument would prove too much. It would result in the
illegality of every merger involving non-fungible products,
regardless of how small the element of independence in
the product or how much or little importance consumers
attach to that independence in the context of the particular
product involved. Congress cannot have intended this to
constitute the "substantial" lessening of competition that
is the concern of Section 7. Actually figuring out how to
express the threshold of substantiality for different types
of non-price competition would be a difficult job, of
course, because there is probably no empirical bright-line
test comparable to the measure of concentration at which
price effects often become visible. Defining such a
threshold is nonetheless a task that needs to be undertaken if antitrust is to fully come to grips with non-price
competition.
61.
An absence of price effects is particularly likely
if we assume relatively low entry barriers and a strategy of
limit pricing by the fIrms in the market.

62.
See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S.
1,20 (1945) (ruling First Amendment considerations
support application of Sherman Act to the media since
both these provisions are intended to encourage diversity,
although the media context did not alter ordinary Sherman
Act standards).

63.
Unfair or Deceptive Advertising of Cigarettes in
Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, Statement of
Basis and Purpose, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8355 (1964).
These criteria were set out in full, and briefly discussed,
in Federal Trade Comm'n v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.,
405 U.S. 233, 244-45 n.5 (1972).
64.
Commission Statement of Policy on the Scope of
the Consumer Unfairness Jurisdiction, 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH)<j[ 13,203 atp. 20,909-03 (Dec. 17, 1980).
65.
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an act or practice is unfair, the Commission may consider
established public policies as evidence to be considered
with all other evidence. Such public policy considerations
may not serve as a primarily basis for such determination").
66.
See Policy Statement, supra note 64, at 20,909
(Most unfairness actions "are brought, not to secondguess the wisdom of particular consumer decisions; but
rather to halt some form of seller behavior that unreasonably creates or takes advantage of an obstacle to the free
exercise of consumer decision making").

67.
Organizationally, countries adopting new laws
might wish to consider the approach that the United
States has taken and have both these types of issues
handled by one agency, equivalent to our FTC. There is
logic to this approach since the two areas of concern have
such a close functional relationship.

68.
There is room for disagreement as to whether
general provisions of this sort are desirable in the first
place. Clearly they have both advantages and disadvantages. As disadvantages, they offer less certainty and leave
more room for judicial discretion than would simple
prohibitions against things like price-fixing. This may be
a particular concern in countries that do not yet have a
tradition of a non-partisan judiciary. On the other hand,
general provisions allow the law to better adapt to
changing business practices and to new forms of organization. A resolution of this dispute is beyond the scope of
this article, although we may note in passing that many
jurisdictions have found it desirable to adopt some form
of general clause, either overtly or through expansive
constructions of terms such as "contracts in restraint of
trade." In any event, if a decision is made to adopt some
form of supplemental general clause, then we believe that
the form set out here will achieve the benefits of that
approach while creating the fewest associated difficulties.
69.
If one contrasts an option-oriented definition of
antitrust to other possibilities, one should conclude that
the option-oriented version is superior. See Neil W.
Averitt & Robert H. Lande, A New Definition of Antitrust: Option Restriction (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on fIle with authors).
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See 15 U.S.c. § 45(n) ("In determining whether
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